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Women's rights litigation in the 1980s:
more of the same?
In the 1980s, women's rights groups continued to seek redress in the legal system in
ever-increasing numbers. And, despite increased opposition, they remained generally
successful.
by Tracey E. George and Lee Epstein
n the September 1983 issue of Judi-
cature, Karen O'Connor and Lee
Epstein published the results of
their examination of the fate of
gender-based cases in the U.S. Supreme
Court during the 1970s.1 Overall, they
found that the justices were quite recep-
tive to such claims, supporting the
women's rights position in about 58 per
cent of the 63 disputes resolved between
the 1969 and 1980 terms.2
O'Connor and Epstein offered three
interrelated explanations for this find-
ing, all of which flow from literature
explicating how groups can maximize
their chances of legal success.
* Becoming a repeat player.3 Women's
rights groups were very active in this
litigation, participating in 73 per cent
(n=46) of the 63 cases. In addition, the
leading participant, the Women's Rights
Project of the ACLU, provided a great
deal of expertise.
o Cooperating with like-minded or-
ganizations.4 Women's rights groups not
only participated with great frequency,
but they did so in a relatively cohesive
fashion. As O'Connor and Epstein wrote,
"women's rights litigation efforts reveal
a high degree of inter-group support....
More specifically, most groups support
the ACLU through the submission of
amicus curiae briefs." 5
o Benefitingfrom low levels of organ-
ized opposition.6 Women's rights groups
did not meet as much opposition in the
courtroom as they did in the legislative
arena. Hence, the absence of competing
claims, O'Connor and Epstein argued,
increased their chances of success in
legal battles.
O'Connor and Epstein's explanations
and overall conclusion-that women's
rights groups should continue to seek
refuge in judicial arenas-made sense in
light of their data, gender-based discrim-
ination cases resolved in the 1970s. For
several reasons, though, we wonder
whether their explanations (and, ulti-
mately, their conclusion) continued to
characterize the litigation efforts of wom-
en's rights groups in the following de-
cade, the 1980s. For one, some have sug-
gested that women's rights groups were
not as anxious in the 1980s, as they were
in the 1970s, to have their disputes
resolved in the Supreme Court. 7 This is
hardly surprising since many of those
organizations viewed President Reagan's
appointees (with the possible exception
of O'Connor) as somewhat insensitive to
We thank Jeffrey Segal for providing us with some
of the data used in this article and the anonymous
reviewers ofJUDICATURE for their helpful comments.
I. O'Connor and Epstein, Beyond legislative
lobbying: women's rights groups and the Supreme
Court, 67 JUDICATURE 134-143 (1983).
2. This figure is particularly impressive com-
pared with the success of black litigants. Between
the 1972 and 1976 terms, the Court supported them
in only 41.5 per cent of their 65 cases; the figure for
women, during the same period was 58.6 per cent
(N=29). See Ulmer and Thomson, Supreme Court
Support for Black Litigants, in Ulmer, ed. COURTS,
LAW AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES (N.Y.: Free Press,
1981).
3. See, generally, Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95-160 (1974).
claims of gender-based discrimination.
Surely epitomizing this new and far less
receptive judicial environment was Rea-
gan's elevation of William Rehnquist to
the chief justiceship. Of all those sitting
on the Court between 1969 and 1981,
Rehnquist was by far the least likely to
support gender claims, opposing them
in 84 per cent of the 64 cases in which he
participated.8 By the same token, some
women's rights advocates opposed two
of Reagan's other nominees-Anthony
4. See, generally, Sorauf, THE WALL OF SEPARA-
TION: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND
STATE (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1976).
5. O'Connor and Epstein, supra n. 1, at 140.
6. See, generally, Vose, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972).
7. See, for example, Nemy, Feminists, Set Back,
to Stress Politics, NEW YORK TIMES, July 7, 1980, at
sec. B, p.29 in which many leaders of women's
rights organizations criticize the Court and suggest
a return to Congress, state legislatures, and "elec-
toral strategies." See also, Estrich and Kerr, Sexual
Justice, in Dorsen, ed. OUR .NDANGERED RIGHTS
(N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1984) in which they review
problems with emerging doctrine.
8. O'Connor and Epstein, Sex and the Supreme
Court, 64 Soc. Sci. Q. 327-331 (1983).
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Kennedy and Antonin Scalia-on sev-
eral grounds, including the perception
that they opposed affirmative action.
Potentially, then, women's rights groups
may have sought to avoid the newly con-
figured Reagan Court. At the very least,
it seems reasonable to suspect that they
may not have participated with the same
vigor as they did in the 1970s.
We also question whether women's
rights groups, if present, were as cohe-
sive in the 1980s as O'Connor and Epstein
reported for the 1970s. As gender-based
doctrine evolved from first generation
questions of basic equality (e.g., should
men be favored over women in the selec-
tion of estate administrators?) i0 to those
involving "special" or "preferential"
treatment (e.g., should employers be
required to provide unpaid leaves of
absence to women disabled from preg-
nancy?)," women's groups apparently
faced a difficult time remaining uni-
fied. 2 On preferential treatment for preg-
nant women, for instance, some advo-
cates [e.g., the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU)] argue that "it is inher-
ently wrong to single out pregnant
women for special treatment, even favor-
able special treatment."' 3 Others, includ-
ing former NOW president, Betty Frie-
dan, aver that "women are different from
men, and there has to be a concept of
equality that takes into account that
women are the ones who have babies."'
14
In short, as the issues became more com-
plex and inherently more dissent-
provoking, the potential for disagree-
ment correspondingly increased.'5
Finally, O'Connor and Epstein as-
serted that women's rights groups bene-
fited from the low level of organized
opposition to their claims. But, again,
9. In this article, we deal exclusively with the
U.S. Supreme Court. But, the same could hold true
for the "Reaganized" lower federal courts, as well.
See, Alumbaugh and Rowland, The links between
platform-based appointment criteria and trial
judges' abortion judgments, 74 JUDICATURE 153
(1990) and Schwartz, PACKING THE COURTS (N.Y.:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988).
10. Reed v. Reed, 400 U.S. 71 (1971).
11. California Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. 683 (1987).
12. This is reflected in both scholarly and jour-
nalistic accounts. See, for example, Gibson, Child-
bearing and Child rearing: Feminists and Reform,
73 VA. L. REV. 1145 (1987); Williams, Equality's
Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Spe-
cial Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 325 (1984-1985); and, Lewin, Maternity-
Leave Suit has Divided Feminists, NEW YORK
TIMES, June 28, 1986, at sec. 1, p.5 2 .
13. Quoted in Lewin, supra n. 12, at 52.
14. Id.
changing times suggest that this no
longer may be the case. We know from
scholarly and journalistic accounts that
the Reagan administration was far less
hospitable to claims of discrimination,
generally speaking, than were its prede-
cessors: his Justice Department went so
far as to actively oppose them in Court. 6
So too, the 1980s ushered in a new era of
optimism among business interests and
conservative public interest law firms
about their likelihood of success in judi-
cial forums. The Pacific Legal Founda-
tion, the Chamber of Commerce, and
others began using the courts with in-
creasing frequency, believing that their
claims-many of which challenged any
form of preferential treatment-would
find a receptive audience.17
In short, O'Connor and Epstein found
that the efforts of women's rights groups
(and the environment surrounding those
efforts) in the 1970s evinced many of the
characteristics important for litigation
success: groups participated frequently
and with growing levels of acumen, they
coordinated their activities, and they
benefited from a low level of opposition
to their claims. It was no surprise, then,
that they won the majority of their cases
in the 1970s. Discursive literature of a
more recent vintage, however, suggests
that those factors may not have been
operative in the 1980s and, in fact, that
the reverse may have held true: groups
sought to avoid the "Reaganized" Court,
they became increasingly divided over
second-generation gender-based issues,
and they faced a growing level of organ-
ized opposition.
If these perceptions accurately de-
picted the litigation environment of the
1980s, then we might expect to find that
15. It is true, for example, that the growing com-
plexity surrounding racially based discrimination
cases in the 1980s affected the ability of key organi-
zations to conduct "model" litigation campaigns.
See Washy, Civil rights litigation by organizations:
constraints and choices, 68 JUDICATURE 337-352
.(1985); Wasby, How Planned is "Planned" Litiga-
tion?, 1984 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 83-
138 (1984).
16. See, for example, Segal, Courts, Executives,
and Legislatures, in Johnson and Gates, eds. THE
AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Wash-
ington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1990); Segal and Reedy,
The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination: The
Role of the Solicitor General, 41 W. POL. Q553-568;
Caplan, THE TENTH JUSTICE (N.Y.: Vintage Books,
1987).
17. See Epstein, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT (Knox-
ville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1985).
18. O'Connor and Epstein, supra n. 1, at 137.
19. A list of these cases is available from the
authors.
the Court was far less hospitable to
claims of gender-based discrimination
than it was during the 1970s. Surely, this
was the lesson of the O'Connor and
Epstein study. As it turns out, though,
such claims fared quite well in the past
decade, even better than in the 1970s.
Between 1981 and 1990, the Court
adopted the pro-rights position in 72 per
cent (n=30) of the 42 cases it decided with
full opinion.
Thus, we are left with something of a
puzzle. Is it the case that scholarly and
journalistic impressions of women's
rights litigators (and of the environment
surrounding them) are just that-impres-
sions-and, in fact, groups have con-
tinued along the path blazed in the 1970s?
Or, is it the case that the discursive litera-
ture is accurate and that other factors now
explain their success? In either event, it
seems a significant and timely task to
update and replicate O'Connor and Ep-
stein's examination of the 1970s for the
1980s. Doing so not only may tell us some-
thing about the litigation activities of
women's rights advocates, but also might
reveal a good deal about those factors we
typically associate with legal success.
To accomplish this, we examined all
gender-based discrimination cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court after the
1980 term. In defining "gender-based
discrimination," we adopted the same
approach as O'Connor and Epstein: we
included allfull opinion cases "that had
ramifications on women's rights includ-
ing those where reproductive freedom
issues were at stake. A women's rights
issue did not have to be the primary issue
presented.... 18 All in all, between the
1981 and 1989 terms, the Court decided
42 cases presenting such issues. 9
In analyzing their cases, O'Connor
and Epstein initially addressed three
questions:
" Which groups have been involved?
" What strategies have they employed?
* What kinds of external opposition
have they faced?
They then considered how the answers
to those questions related to the success
of women's rights litigators. Our exam-
ination follows suit.
Participation in the 1980s
O'Connor and Epstein found two as-
pects of the participation of women's
rights groups significant explanations
JERRY WARSHAW
for the success of gender-based claims in
the 1970s. The first simply was that they
appeared before the Court with great
frequency, participating in 73 per cent of
the 63 cases. The second was that the
leading litigator-the Women's Rights
Project (WRP) of the ACLU-also was
the one with the greatest expertise.
Though the WRP was quite young in
the 1970s, "the ACLU was more than a
half century old. Therefore, the WRP
enjoyed from its creation the experience
of a seasoned litigator" with sufficient
staff and resources.20 Moreover, in the
1970s, the WRP was headed by Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, the leading architect of
ground-breaking victories in this area of
the law.2 The importance of the ACLU's
involvement was evident: when it partici-
pated, the chances of success for a gender-
based claim increased by 16 per cent.
Do these twin patterns hold for the
1980s? Though we had some reasons
(e.g., groups sought to avoid the "Rea-
ganized" Court) to believe that they
would not, the data reveal otherwise; in
fact, the pressure group environment
(i.e., pro-women's rights) surrounding
gender-based cases exploded on a num-
ber of dimensions.22 First, and most
obvious, at least one women's rights
group participated as a direct sponsor or
as an amicus curiae in 79 per cent (n=33)
of the 42 cases decided between 1981 and
1990, representing a slight increase from
the already high percentage (73) reported
by O'Connor and Epstein.
Where we see the "explosion," though,
is in the number of groups actively par-
ticipating in this area. During the 1970s,
five organizations-ACLU, NOW, Wom-
en's Equity Action League (WEAL),
Women's Legal Defense Fund (WLDF),
and Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR)-dominated litigation, each par-
ticipating in more than 20 per cent of the
cases in which at least one women's
rights group participated. As we illus-
trate in Figure 1,23 in the 1980s nine
groups met that 20 per cent threshold for
all 42 cases (and not just those 33 con-
taining the presence of at least one
women's rights litigator).2
Several other aspects of Figure 1 merit
attention. First, virtually all of the major
advocates of the 1970s evinced higher
involvement rates in the 1980s, with
20. O'Connor, WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' USE OF
TIlE COURTS 126 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1980).
21. Ginsburg's brief in Reed v. Reed served as the
blueprint for first generation gender-based litiga-
tion, leading some to call it the "Grandmother
brief." As Greenberg, TIlE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 381 (St Paul, Minn.: West Publish-
ing, 1977) noted, "Its approach [was] seminal:
pressing the Court for 'strict scrutiny equal protec-
tion standard' while arguing for a lesser [one] in the
alternative."
For more on the WRP and/or Ginsburg, see
Cowan, Women's Rights through Litigation, 8
COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 373-412 (1976); Cortner,
THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES POLICY
183 (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1975); and, Berger,
"Litigation on Behalf of Women," (NY: Ford
Foundation) mimeo (1979).
22. We obtained data on the participation of
some more than doubling their partici-
pation. NOW entered about a third of
the 1970s cases; in the 1980s, it was pres-
ent in well over half. Even more dra-
matic were the efforts of the WLDF, a
group created in 1971 to provide pro
bono assistance to women. During its
early years, it filed or cosigned amicus
curiae briefs in less than 25 per cent of
the cases; by the 1980s, that figure sky-
rocketed to almost 50 per cent. And, the
most successful litigant of the 1970s-
the ACLU-maintained its position as
the leading advocate of women's rights
in the judicial arena, participating in an
almost identical percentage of cases dur-
ing both decades.
A second finding is that groups pre-
viously less involved in litigation be-
came active participants in the 1980s.
The American Association of University
Women (AAUW), Equal Rights Advo-
cates (ERA), League of Women Voters
interest group litigators from the microfiche rec-
ords of briefs filed in the cases.
23. In their figure depicting participation rates,
O'Connor and Epstein distinguished between the
filing of amicus curiae briefs and sponsorship.
What their figure indicated was that very few
groups, other than theACLU, sponsored cases. Our
findings parallel theirs, with only theACLU spon-
soring a notable amount of litigation (n=7). See
infra, p. 318.
24. If we consider only those 33 cases, the number
of groups which meet the 20 per cent minimum
rises to 16. The six additional groups are: Califor-
nia Women Lawyers, Employment Law Center,
National Bar Association-Women's Division,
Northwest Women's Law Center, Women Em-
ployed, and Women Lawyers Association of Los
Angeles. Moreover, CCR meets the threshold re-
quirement ifweonly look at this subgroup of cases.
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(LWV), and Women's Law Project
(WLP), were not Court novices-they
had made a limited number of appear-
ances in the 1970s. By the 1980s, however,
they became regular players.2 5
We see the continued involvement of
groups such as NOW and the ACLU as
important: as the literature indicates,
their long-term involvement in and com-
mitment to litigation allowed them to
accrue "repeat player" status, with all its
attendant advantages.26 Yet, the entrance
of new groups may be of equal signifi-
cance. In the 1970s, the Court heard
largely from those organizations-WRP,
NOW, WEAL, WLDF-created in the
wake of the women's movement of the
1960s and 1970s. Today, however, the
range has widened to encompass some of
the older ones-the League of Women
Voters and the American Association of
University Women-whose names carry
a symbol of "traditionalism," not "radi-
calism." Hence, pressure on the Court
from women's rights groups not only has
increased in degree,27 but also in kind.
Participation by women's rights advo-
cates also has increased in depth. Al-
though O'Connor and Epstein did not
report the average number of amicus
curiae briefs filed in their cases, we could
estimate that figure to be around two to
three briefs per case.28 If we exclude three
abortion cases, 29 which generated an
unusually high degree of participation, 0
we find that an average gender-rights
case decided in the 1980s attracted about
four briefs supporting the pro-rights
side. That figure increases to nearly five
briefs per case if we omit those cases
(n=4) in which no amici were present on
either side. In sum, women not only are
participating at greater rates in the 1980s
25. The remaining newcomer, the National Wom-
en's Law Center (NWLC), was founded in 1981 and
thus was absent from 1970s litigation.
26. See Galanter, supra n. 3.
27. There is at least one other indication of the
proliferation of women's rights interests. In their
note 27, O'Connor and Epstein listed nearly 60
organizations that participated as an amicus curiae
in at least one case. If we exclude Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989),
which generated an extraordinary amount of atten-
tion from women's rights groups, the number of
organizations participating in I to 5 cases (decided
in the 1980s) is close to 90. For a list of these groups,
contact the authors.
28. See O'Connor and Epstein, Amicus Curiae
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 16
LAW & Soc'y REV. 311-320 (1981-82).
29. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109
S.Ct. 3040 (1989); Ohio v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health Services, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (1990), and
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (1990).
Table 1 Inter-group support: a comparison of the 19709 and 1980*
Support for...
ACLU CCR NOW WEAL WLDF
Group 70s 80s 70s 80s 709 80s 70s 80 70s 80s
ACLU** - - .42 .69 .42 .58
CGR .78 .71 - - .44 1.00 .11 .57 .33 .86
NOW .79 .75 .21 .29 - - .42 .54 .58 .79
WEAL .64 .73 .09 .27 .73 .87 - - .55 .93
WLDF .54 .71 .23 .29 .85 .91 .46 .67 - -
We measured inter-group support in the same way as O'Connor and Epstein, that is, as the number of cases in which both
groups were present divided by number of cases the first group entered. Hence, support=n of supportive cases
total cases entered
For example, in the 1980s, the CCR supported the ACLU in 71 per cent of the cases CCR attorneys entered.
**O'Connor and Epstein did not report data for the ACLU's support of other groups.
than in the 1970s, but they also are filing
more amicus curiae briefs per case than
ever before.
Strategies in the 1980s
Cooperation among like-minded inter-
ests is an important ingredient for litiga-
tion success, one O'Connor and Epstein
found particularly relevant to the efforts
of women's rights groups. In fact, in de-
scribing their findings on the strategies
used by women's groups in the 1970s,
they wrote that their "litigation efforts
reveal a high degree of intergroup sup-
port.. .more specifically most groups
support the ACLU through the submis-
sion of amicus curiae briefs."3 Certainly,
their data, which took the form of sup-
port scores,32 attest to this: all organiza-
tions-from the more "radical" Center
for Constitutional Rights (CCR) to the
more "traditional" Women's Equity Ac-
tion League (WEAL)-filed amicus cur-
iae briefs with or in support of the ACLU
in over 50 per cent of the cases in which
they entered. Moreover, with but one not-
able exception-the CCR-the major lit-
igators regularly allied with each other.3
Indeed, the average support score re-
ported by O'Connor and Epstein for the
30. Webster set an all-time high for the numberof
amicus curiae briefs filed. For more on this see
Behuniak-Long, Friendly fire: amici curiae and
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 74 Juoic-
ATURE 261 (1991).
31. O'Connor and Epstein, supra n. 1, at 140.
32. They measured one group's support for an-
other as the number of cases in which both groups
were present divided by the number of cases the first
group entered.
33. CCR had low inter-group support scores
with virtually all organizations except the ACLU
and NOW. It evinced its lowest score with WEAL
(1 per cent). This is not surprising, as O'Connor
and Epstein explain, because CCR was strongly
committed to abortion litigation while WEAL
"was organized by several NOW members who
were in disagreement with NOW's public support
of reproductive freedom." For more on this see
McGlen and O'Connor, WOMEN'S RIGHTS (NY:
Praeger, 1983).
1970s was nearly .50 among all groups.
Two factors help explain the high lev-
els of cooperation between the leading
groups in the 1970s. First, Ginsburg and
the ACLU's WRP actively attempted to
organize and coordinate the legal efforts
of women's organizations so as to ad-
dress the Court with one potent voice.
Second and concomitant, the issues
around which the groups rallied were of
the most basic type-first generation
cases involving core equality issues on
which agreement readily existed.
In contrast, the cases of the 1980s were
generally more complex and multifac-
eted, presenting a new generation of is-
sues, such as preferential treatment.
Thus, the question becomes whether di-
verse sorts of women's groups could con-
tinue to present the Court with a unified
front as the issues became inherently divi-
sive. We address this in Tables 1 and 2,
which depict the extent to which the most
active advocates allied with one another.
Let us first consider Table 1 in which
we compare patterns of support among
the five leading groups in the 1970s to
those in the 1980s. Overall, we see in-
creases in inter-agreement scores; for
example, between 1970 and 1980, NOW
supported WEAL in 42 per cent of the
cases and received its support in 73 per
cent. As we depict, the relationship has
grown stronger in both directions. This
is a particularly interesting finding given
that WEAL and NOW are not without
their share of previous disagreements.
Indeed, members of NOW, who were dis-
satisfied over its support of abortion and
other issues at the center of the more
controversial cases of the 1980s, created
WEAL in 1968. Yet today the two are
concurring more than ever. Even CCR,
which was something of a solitary player
during the 1970s, became part of the
"team." It supported (and was supported
by) all groups at a much higher rate, a
phenomenon occurring largely because
many of the players were increasingly
involved in CCR's main legal game-
reproductive freedom cases. Furthermore
(and consistent with previous research),
is the central role the ACLU played. Not
only did it continue to lend its expertise
Figure 1
Participation of women's rights organizations:









ACLU CCR NOW WEAL WLDF AAUW ERA LWV NWLC WLP
'Groups listed here are: the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), the National
Organization for Women (NOW), the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL), the Women's Legal Defense Fund (WLDF),
the American Association of University Women (AAUW), Equal Rights Advocates (ERA), the League of Women Voters
(LWV), the National Women's Law Center (NWLC), and the Women's Law Project (WLP).
Table 2 Inter-group support: "newcomers" support for "oldtlmers" In the 19808*
Support for oldtlmers...
Newcomers ACLU CCR NOW WEAL WLDF
AAUW .67 .25 .92 .67 .83
ERA .92 .33 .92 .75 .92
LWV .89 .33 .89 .67 .89
NWLC .75 .25 .92 .83 1.00
WLP .77 .39 1.00 .54 .69
*These data indicate the degree to which "newcomers" supported "oldtimers." Support, again, is defined as:
n of supportive cases
total cases entered
For example, AAUW supported the ACLU in 67 per cent of the cases in which it participated.
to the majority of gender-based cases,
but it also still garnered support from
organizations as diverse as the CCR and
the League of Women Voters. Of the
seven cases sponsored by the ACLU, six
attracted supporting amicus curiae briefs
filed by one or more of the groups illus-
trated in Figure 1.31
Table 2 depicts how those groups
with the oldtimers, however radical. The
average level of support reported in
Table 2 is an astonishing 72 per cent.
The data in Tables 1 and 2 certainly
bear out the conclusion that women's
rights groups continue to present the
Court with a unified front. What is per-
haps more interesting is that they have
done so on complex, "second-genera-
which participated in less than 20 per
cent of the 1970s cases ("newcomers" to
the modern era of litigation ) entered the
fray, whether in cooperation with or
apart from the original groups ("oldti-
mers"). What the data indicate is that
these newcomers, however traditional in
ideological orientation, have coalesced
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tion" issues. Consider, California Sav-
ings & Loan v. Guerra,35 a case which
could have created a great deal of dissen-
sion among the groups. In Guerra, Lil-
lian Garland-a woman employed by
the petitioner-took a pregnancy dis-
ability leave. When she returned three
months later, the bank informed her that
it had filled her position. Garland then
filed a complaint with Guerra (Director
of the Department of Fair Employment
and Housing), who in turn charged the
bank with violating the state's Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act (FEHA).
Under this Act, employers must provide
female employees with an unpaid preg-
nancy disability leave (of up to four
months) and, generally, reinstate them
upon their return.
Before hearings on this charge com-
menced, the bank (and several other bus-
iness interests) brought suit in federal
court, alleging that the relevant section
of FEHA36 was "inconsistent with and
was preempted" by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. In a summary judg-
ment, the district court held for the bank,
asserting that state employers who com-
ply with the law "are subject to reverse
discrimination suits under Title VII
brought by temporarily disabled males
who do not receive the same treatment as
female employee disabled by preg-
nancy..."sT As such, Title VII preempted
the state's law. The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that
judgment, largely on the grounds that
the district court "flout[ed]" Title VII
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) of 1978. In its view Congress
enacted the PDA "to construct a floor
beneath which pregnancy disability ben-
efits may not drop-not a ceiling above
which they may not rise."3 8 Thus, it held
that the state law was compatible with
Title VII as amended by the PDA.
Certainly, the centerpiece of Guerra-
the issue of preferential treatment for
pregnant women-is something over
which women's rights groups are di-
vided. And, quite as clearly, once the
Supreme Court decided to hear the dis-
34. The one exception was Patsy v. Board of
Regents of Florida, 102 S.Ct. 2557, in which several
civil rights, but no women's rights, groups filed
supporting briefs.
35. 107 S.Ct. 683 (1987).
36, §12945 (b)(2).
37. 34 FEP Cases 562 at 568 (1983).
38. 758 F2d 390, at 395 (1985).
pute they could have carried that debate
into the courtroom, going so far as to
align themselves with competing par-
ties. But they did not do so; rather, each
participating group generally supported
the respondent, while arguing from its
distinct perspective. Some unequivocally
backed the state; for example, in a brief
filed for nearly 40 groups and individu-
als (including Betty Friedan),3 9 the Coa-
lition for Reproductive Equality in the
Workplace argued that the state law
remedied "the discriminatory burden
that inadequate leave policies place on
working women's right to procreative
choice." Italso noted that the law consti-
tuted neither "protective" legislation nor
affected "the rights of male employees."
In its amicus curiae brief, the ACLU
(on behalf of four other organizations)40
made a rather different claim; indeed, it
went so far as to suggest that the law was
protective in nature and, as such, re-
flected "stereotypical assumptions and
unnecessarily rel[ied] on invidious dis-
tinctions." Still, it did not ask the Court
to strike the law or find that it was pre-
empted by Title VII. Rather, it argued
that employers would violate the federal
law if they complied with the state sta-
tute "by providing leaves of absence
with job security to women temporarily
incapacitated by pregnancy without pro-
viding the same benefit to other employ-
ees similar in their ability or inability to
work." In other words, the "remedial
intentions of the law should not apply
exclusively to pregnant women."
In a brief for five organizations," l
NOW presented yet another perspective.
It suggested that the PDA did not pre-
empt the California law because the two
"can be read as imposing mutual and
complementary obligations...." How-
39. Interest groups cosigning this brief were:
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union,
AFL-CIO; 9 to 5, National Association of Working
Women; Planned Parenthood Federation of Amer-
ica, Inc.; California School Employees Association;
American Federation of State, County and Munici-
pal Employees, District Council 36; California
Federation of Teachers; Coalition of Labor Union
Women, Los Angeles Chapter; Union of Food and
Commercial Workers, Local 770; Utility Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, Local 132; Orange
County Central Labor Council; American Associa-
tion of University Women, California State Div-
ision; Women For; Los Angeles City Commission
on the Status of Women; Comision FemeneildeLos
Angeles; American Jewish Congress- Pacific
Southwest Region; Mexican American Bar Associa-
tion of Los Angeles County; Hispanic Women's
Council; Lawyer's Club of San Diego; Women
Lawyers of Almeda County; Women Lawyers of
ever, it asserted that the Court ought to
uphold the California law in such a way
that requires employers "to comply with
both it and the PDA by providing un-
paid disability leave to all employees ......
If the Court failed to construe it as such,
NOW et al. argued that the California
law conflicts with the PDA. Clearly,
such divergence of opinion among usual
allies is not ideal; still, it is surely prefer-
able to out-and-out organizational div-
ision. Put somewhat differently, given
the divisive nature of issues of preferen-
tial treatment, groups could have aligned
themselves with competing sides. That
they did not do so, choosing instead to
harmonize their opinions as best they
could, reveals their interest in keeping
such debates out of Court.
In general, then, what can we con-
clude about the strategies of women's
rights advocates in gender-based cases?
On some level, the data indicate that
organizations, representing a range of
interests, are cooperating more than ever
to present the Court with a unified front.
On another, though, they are divided
over complex second-generation issues,
a fact which Guerra amply demonstrates.
Even so, they have sought to overcome
these divisions by stressing the commo-
nalities of their perspectives, rather than
the differences.
Opposition in the 1980s
A final factor offered by O'Connor and
Epstein to explain the success of gender-
based claims was that such cases failed to
attract significant opposition in Court. In
direct and marked contrast to their legisla-
tive efforts, in which substantial numbers
of opponents coalesced to fight against
efforts to ratify the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, women's rights advocates faced no
San Luis Obispo County; Inland Counties Women
at Law; Queen's Bench; and, Los Angeles Feminist
Legal Scholars.
40. The League of Women Voters of the United
States; the League of Women Voters of California;
the National Women's Political Caucus; and, the
Coal Employment Project.
41. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund;
National Bar Association, Women's Lawyers Div-
ision, Washington Area Chapter; National Wom-
en's Law Center; Women's Law Project; and, Wom-
en's Legal Defense Fund. The brief was filed "in
support of neither party."
42. O'Connor, The amicus curiae role of the U.S.
solicitor general in Supreme Court litigation, 66
JUDICATuRE 257, 263 (1983).
43. This is particularly true in gender-based
cases. See Segal and Reedy, supra n. 16.
44. This figure does not include the three abor-
tion cases, which would have skewed the results.
major foes in their legal battles. In barely
half of the cases did organized interests
file amicus curiae briefs at odds with the
gender-based claim. And those organiza-
tions that did tended to have a financial
stake in case outcomes (e.g., the Chamber
of Commerce), rather than the more ideo-
logically based concerns of those groups
present in legislative forums.
Moreover, one of the most influential
Courtroom players-the Office of the
U.S. Solicitor General-did not present
a threat to rights groups by countering
their claims. Indeed, the various presi-
dential administrations of the 1970s gen-
erally either remained out of the fray or
provided needed and welcomed support.
For example, President Carter's Solicitor
General, Wade McCree, filed pro-civil
rights amicus curiae briefs in 87.5 per
cent of the 32 cases in which he partici-
pated.4 2 Given the reputation of the Of-
fice of the Solicitor General as a most
successful Court player, such support
clearly enhanced the chances of victory.4s
Did the same patterns hold in the
1980s? Or, as we might predict, did
organized interests and/or governmehts
counter the claims of women's rights lit-
igators in Court? Indeed, they did: just as
we discovered an increase in the amount
of pressure activity from women's groups
on the pro-rights side, so too we noted a
proliferation of groups actively oppos-
ing gender-based claims. Of the 33 cases
in which a women's rights group partic-
ipated, organized interests filed opposi-
tion amicus curiae briefs in 76.9 per cent,
up from 58.6 per cent in the 1970s. The
average case decided in the 1980s gener-
ated about two opposing friend-of-the-
court briefs.
4
To some extent, those numbers reflect
heightened levels of opposition from the
same sources found by O'Connor and
Epstein. For example, in the 1970s bus-
iness interests filed amicus curiae briefs
in 69.2 per cent (n=9) of the 13 cases
involving employment discrimination;
in the 1980s, the Court heard an identical
number of such cases, but the frequency
of opposition rose to 84.6 per cent (n=l 1).
Activity among pro-life groups also sky-
rocketed: in the 1970s, organizations
such as Americans United for Life and
the U.S. Catholic Conference filed briefs
in 75 per cent of the decade's 12 repro-
ductive freedom cases (n=9); in the 1980s,
these sorts of interests were present in 89
per cent of those disputes (n=9).15 More-
over, we see that activity has mushroomed
within those areas; for instance, in the
major abortion case of the 1970s, Roe v.
Wade,4" seven groups filed or cosigned
amicus curiae briefs in support of the
state. In Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, that figure was over 80.
47
On one hand, then, opposition to
gender-based claims evinces more of the
same activity observed by O'Connor and
Epstein. On the other, we observe new
entrants into the gender-based arena,
specifically conservative public interest
law firms (CPILFs).48 By the onset of the
decade, regional legal foundations, such
as the Pacific (PLF) and Mountain States
(MSLF) Legal Foundations,49 had begun
countering the claims of women's rights
advocates in the courts. At least one
CPILF was present in six cases, all of
which involved claims of employment
discrimination. In general, their partici-
pation took the form of amicus curiae
submissions; however, the MSLF spon-
sored one suit, Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Agency, Santa Clara County," ar-
guing that the state should not give
women preference over men in promo-
tions. Its position was supported by ami-
cus curiae briefs filed by both the Pacific
and Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundations.
Another source of active opposition
was the Office of the U.S. Solicitor Gen-
eral. We suspected that the Reagan ad-
ministration would bring to the justices
a more limited interpretation of equal
protection guarantees and of privacy. In
the context of gender-based claims, we
were not disappointed. As we indicate in
Figure 2, of the 16 cases in which the
solicitors general serving under Reagan
and Bush chose (or were invited) to par-
ticipate as amicus curiae, they filed
against the women's rights position in
82 per cent (n=13).Sl And, though it was
the participation of Reagan's (and
Bush's) solicitors general in abortion
cases that received a good deal of media
attention, they did not limit their oppo-
sition to that issue. The administration
filed briefs opposing affirmative action
for women, preferential treatment for
pregnant women, and so forth. In short,
the Reagan administration initiated a
break from the previous administration's
tradition of supporting women's rights
groups in Court.52
As a result of the proliferation of
Figure 2
Participation of the Office of the U.S. Solicitor General as an amicus









Not present Pro-rights Anti-rights
'This figure indicates the percentage of cases in which solicitors general filed no briefs, filed amicus
curiae briefs supporting the women's rights position, and filed briefs opposing it. We thank Jeffrey
Segal for providing us with some of the data used to generate this figure.
organized interests on both sides of
gender-based suits, pluralism now
abounds in women's rights litigation.
Consider Table 3 in which we depict
amicus curiae briefs filed in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins." As noted, various
legal associations, women's groups, and
employee organizations filed in support
of Hopkins. This, of course, is not at all
surprising: the brief submitted by NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund, et
al., in particular, represents a continua-
tion of the trend depicted by O'Connor
and Epstein. What we find in the 1980s,
though, is that they are now being coun-
tered. In Hopkins, the United States and
the Equal Employment Advisory Coun-
cil filed in support of the accounting
45. Organized interests were absent in Bolger v.
Youngs Drugs [103 S.Ct. 2875 (1983)] which in-
volved not abortion but rather the advertising of
birth control material.
46. 410 U.S.113 (1972).
47. Behuniak-Long, supra n. 30.
48. The Equal Employment Advisory Council
also continued to participate in cases involving
preferential job treatment.
49. The other legal foundations include: Great
Plains, Gulf Coast, Landmark, Mid-Atlantic, and
New England.
50. 107 S.Ct. 1442 (1987).
51. We should note that the federal government,
on behalf of the EEOCor the Department of Educa-
tion, represented ("sponsored") the women's rights
position in five cases.
52. While we see the increasing presence of the
firm; in other cases, particularly those
involving reproductive freedom, the
number of interests filing against the
rights position has actually surpassed
those in support of it.
Success in the 1980s
In the introduction to this article, we
noted the high rate of success by women's
rights groups found by O'Connor and
Epstein and we summarized the three
explanations they offered for those rates.
We also noted that the claims of women's
rights advocates have continued to fare
well in the 1980s. This left us with a
puzzle that we have largely solved. That
is, despite journalistic and scholarly im-
pressions, two of the factors noted by
solicitor general and CPILFs, we have yet to
observe the entry of conservative women-member
organizations into the courts. Groups, such as;the
Eagle Forum, rarely allow arguments by feminist
groups to go uncountered in legislative forums;
thus, we were surprised to find that they have yet to
make their presence known in thejudiciary, all but
eschewing it. The one exception are single-issue
pro-life organizations, including Feminists for Life,
which regularly filed on behalf of governmental
interests in reproductive freedom cases.
53. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). At issue here were "the
respective burdens of proof of a defendant and
plaintiff in a suit under Title Vii" when it already
has been demonstrated that the employer's decision
(in this instance, the refusal to repropose a woman
for partnership in an accounting firm) was the
result of "legitimate and illegitimate" motives.
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*Data obtained from Congressional Information Service,
U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, Docket No.
87-1167.
O'Connor and Epstein-the participa-
tion of women's rights groups and the
degree of cooperation among like-
minded interests-we found to hold for
the 1980s. But, the third-the lack of
organized opposition-was not present
in the 1980s; rather, women's rights
groups were opposed on all fronts by a
wide range of groups, business interests,
and the federal government.
Did increased opposition to the claims
of women's rights groups affect their
success rate? The simple answer is no. As
we already indicated, in fact, women's
rights advocates fared better in the 1980s
than they did in the 1970s. Between 1981
and 1990, the Court took the pro-rights
position in 72 per cent (n=30) and the
opposing posture in 24 percent (n=10). 51
Moreover, we do not see a significant
decline in success after Rehnquist
54. Two cases, Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft
[103 S.Ct. 2517 (1983)] and Grove City College v.
Bell [104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984)], resulted in somewhat
mixed outcomes.
55. O'Connor and Epstein, supra n. 1, at 143.
Table 3 Amicus Curiae Briefs flied In
































Bar Association of the
District of Columbia; and
Women's Equity Action
League.
3. Committees on Civil
Rights, Labor and
Employment Law, and Sex
and Law of the Association
of the Bar of the City of
New York.
4. AFL-CIO
ascended to the chief justiceship: prior to
1986, the Court adopted the women's
position in 77 per cent (N=29); after 1986,
in 69 (N=13).
What is more, this success rate actu-
ally increases if we look only at those 33
cases in which at least one women's
rights litigator participated. In such dis-
putes, the Court took the pro-women's
rights side in 75 per cent, a figure that
not only compares favorably to the over-
all rate, but is even somewhat higher
than that reported by O'Connor and
Epstein for the 1970s (63 percent). More-
over, if no feminist organization was
present, the gender-based claim suc-
ceeded in only 55.6 per cent (n=5) of the
cases. It also is true that the premiere
litigator of the 1970s-the ACLU-
actually performed better in the 1980s.
When it entered litigation (n=42) be-
tween 1970 and 1980, the Court adopted
its position in 66 per cent of the cases.
Between 1981 and 1990, it won 77 per
cent (n=20) of its 26 cases.
Given the data we already have pre-
sented, these findings are less than sur-
prising. We would expect the ACLU, in
particular, to have been successful: its
experience in the 1970s helped it to
accrue repeat player status, a status of
which it took full advantage by continu-
ing to litigate in the 1980s. By the same
logic, though, we supposed that federal
opposition to claims of gender-based
discrimination would have negatively
affected the success of women's rights
advocates; after all, the solicitor general
is akin to a "tenth Justice," typically
able to exert a high degree of influence
on the justices. Yet we found that admin-
istration opposition did not significantly
damage the feminist cause: of the 13
cases in which Reagan's (and Bush's)
solicitors general filed opposing amicus
curiae briefs, they met with success in 31
per cent (n=4). In contrast, when they
filed in support of the women's rights
position (n=3), they ended up on the
winning side in every case.
Conclusion
After completing their examination of
1970s gender-based cases, O'Connor and
Epstein concluded "that women's rights
groups... may continue to find that the
Court is receptive to their arguments be-
cause thus far, unlike the legislative for-
um, women have faced minimal opposi-
tion. Perhaps more important, how-
ever... the ACLU's emergence as 'the'
spokesperson of women's interests has
influenced the Court, particularly when
its efforts have been supported by other
groups."55
Despite some speculation to the con-
trary, O'Connor and Epstein's observa-
tions of the 1970s were largely borne out
in the 1980s. Women's rights groups
have continued to seek redress in the
legal system in ever-increasing numbers
and have done so in a relatively unified
fashion. In some measure, though, their
conclusion failed to foresee increasing
use of the Court by competing interests.
Unlike the 1970s, feminist organizations
now can expect to find their legal claims
countered by divergent and varied organ-
izational interests and by the federal
government. Seen in this light, today's
courts are no less contentious than legis-
lative arenas.
Yet, our data indicate that the new
pluralism surrounding claims of gender-
based discrimination has not signifi-
cantly affected the success of women's
rights advocates: at least through the
1980s, the Court has generally supported
their claims. We view this as an impor-
tant finding in a number of regards.
Substantively, it leads us to echo recom-
mendations of the past: despite increased
opposition, women's rights groups may
still attain important policy objectives
through the courts. On a more theoreti-
cal note, though, it leaves us with some
unaddressed questions. Most important
is this: what explains the inability of
organizations and the U.S. government
to counter successfully the claims of
women's rights groups? A number of
answers exist, some of which might
negate our above recommendation. For
example, it may be the case that groups,
like the Pacific and Mountain States
Legal Foundations, are just beginning
to learn how to litigate gender-based
claims, and that eventually they will
prove to be a significant counter force. If
this occurs, then we might expect to find
women's rights advocates facing new
challenges as the Court continues to
resolve disputes into the 1990s. 0
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